2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-21-2009

Gilbert Williams v. Robert Bitner

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009

Recommended Citation
"Gilbert Williams v. Robert Bitner" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 2006.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/2006

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

ALD-73

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3247
___________
GILBERT R. WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT S. BITNER;
DONALD J. JONES;
JAMES T. WYNDER, JR;
OFFICER DIETRICH;
OFFICER DOHL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-1542)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 8, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Gilbert S. Williams, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed pro se an action under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials and employees of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections alleging violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing. On June 8, 2006, Williams was given a
misconduct report for “Engaging in Sexual Acts.” Following a disciplinary hearing,
Williams was found guilty of the charged misconduct and sanctioned to 90 days in
disciplinary custody. Williams unsuccessfully appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision
through all levels of review before filing the instant action for compensatory and punitive
damages.
Williams claimed that he was unlawfully incarcerated because of the disciplinary
sanction, placing him in the Restricted Housing Unit for 90 days. In addition, Williams
alleged that Defendants “conspired to unlawfully incarcerate him” and deny him due
process and his equal protection rights. The District Court dismissed Williams’ complaint
as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Williams then filed a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint in which he alleged a violation of his rights by the
“‘customs or ‘policy’ promulgated by the Department of Corrections” and a denial of due
process during his disciplinary hearing because he was not represented and was denied
the opportunity to call witnesses. The District Court denied Williams’ motion. He timely
appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question. 3d Cir. LAR
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27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.
Williams’ claim that he was denied due process and unlawfully placed in
disciplinary housing lacks legal merit. “Discipline by prison officials in response to a
wide range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). Under Sandin, prison disciplinary
segregation will implicate a protectable liberty interest only if it dramatically departs, in
length of time or otherwise, from basic prison conditions. See, e.g., Smith v. Mensinger,
293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months in disciplinary segregation is insufficient
to trigger a due process violation); Griffin v. Vaughan, 112 F.3d 703, 706-08 (3d Cir.
1997) (fifteen months in administrative custody is insufficient to trigger a due process
violation). The District Court reasoned that the sanction of 90 days in disciplinary
segregation was not an atypical or significant deprivation that would give rise to a liberty
interest under Sandin. We agree. This same thinking undermines the specific allegations
made by Williams in his amended complaint. The lack of representation and inability to
call witnesses, as well as any other alleged procedural defects, lack legal significance in
the absence of any protectable interest. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
Williams also claimed a conspiracy by the Defendants to unlawfully punish him by
charging him with false misconduct. The District Court correctly rejected Williams’
claims, reasoning that the allegations were vague and conclusory and did not present a
cognizable § 1983 conspiracy claim. See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d
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Cir. 1991) (conspiracy claims based on plaintiff’s subjective suspicions and unsupported
speculation were properly dismissed at screening).
With respect to the equal protection claim that he was discriminated against, the
District Court correctly concluded that Williams failed to allege that Defendants engaged
in intentional or purposeful discrimination or that he was treated differently than similarly
situated individuals on the basis of his race. See Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921, 929
(3d Cir. 1985). Williams claimed only that his civil rights were violated by defendants of
the opposite race, but that is insufficient to state an equal protection claim. See id.
(intentional or purposeful discrimination is a necessary element of an equal protection
violation).
For the foregoing reason, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6. The motion
for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir.
1993)
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